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THE ESSENCE OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE

I. SOCIAL TECHNIQUE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT MOTIVATION

living together of human beings is characterized by the setting up of institutions that regulate this living together. Such
an institution is called an "order." The living together of individuals, in itself a biological phenomenon, becomes a social phenomenon
by the very fact of being regulated. Society is ordered living together, or,
more accurately put, society is the ordering of the living together of individuals.
The function of every social order is to bring about certain mutual behavior of individuals; to induce them to certain positive or negative behavior, to certain action or abstention from action. To the individual the
order appears as a complex of rules that determine how the individual
should conduct himself. These rules are called norms.
According to the manner in which the socially desired behavior is
brought about, various types of social orders can be distinguished. These
types-it is ideal types that are to be presented here-are characterized
by the specific motivation resorted to by the order to induce individuals
to behave as desired. The motivaion may be indirect or direct. The order
may attach certain advantages to its observance and certain disadvantages to its non-observance, and hence make desire for the promised advantage or fear of the threatened disadvantage a motive for behavior.
Behavior conforming to the order is achieved by a sanction provided by
the order itself. The principle of reward and punishment-the principle
of retribution-fundamental for social living, consists in associating conduct in accordance with the order and conduct contrary to the order with
a promised advantage or a threatened disadvantage respectively, as sanctions.
The order can, however, even without promise of a reward in case of
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obedience and without threat of a disadvantage in case of disobedience,
i.e., without decreeing sanctions, require conduct that appeals directly
to the individuals as advantageous, so that the mere idea of a norm decreeing this behavior suffices as a motive for conduct conforming to the
norm. This type of direct motivation is seldom to be met with in social
reality in its full purity.
In the first place, there are hardly any norms the purport of which appeals directly to the individuals whose conduct they regulate so that the
mere idea of them suffices for motivation. Moreover, the social behavior
of individuals is always accompanied by a judgment of value, namely,
the idea that conduct in accordance with the order is "good" whereas
that contrary to the order is "bad." Hence obedience to the order is usually connected with the approval of one's fellow men; disobedience, with
their disapproval. The effect of this reaction of the group to conduct of
the individuals in accordance with or at variance to the order, is that of a
sanction of the order. From a realistic point of view the decisive difference is not between social orders whose efficacy rests on sanctions and
those whose efficacy is not based on sanctions. Every social order is somehow "sanctioned" by the specific reaction of the community to conduct
of its members corresponding to or at variance with the order. This is
also true of highly developed moral systems, which most closely approach
the type of direct motivation by sanctionless norms. The only difference is
that certain social orders themselves provide definite sanctions, whereas
in others, the sanctions consist in the automatic reaction of the community not expressly provided by the order.
The sanctions provided by the social order itself may have a transcendental, that is a religious, or a social-immanent character..
In the first case, the sanctions provided by the order consist in advantages or disadvantages that are to be applied to the individuals by a
superhuman authority, a being characterized more or less as God-like.
According to the idea that individuals have of superhuman beings, in the
beginnings of religious development, they exist not in a Hereafter different from the Here, but closely connected with men in the nature surrounding them. The dualism of the Here and the Hereafter is still unknown to
primitive man. His first gods are the souls of the dead, especially dead
ancestors, that live in trees, rivers, rocks, and especially in certain animals. It is they that guarantee the maintenance of the primitive social
order by punishing its violation with death, sickness, unluckiness in the
chase, and in similar ways and by rewarding its observance with long life,
health, and luck in hunting. Retribution does indeed emanate from di-
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vinity, but it is realized Here. For nature is explained by primitive man
according to the principle of retribution. The earliest social order has a
completely religious character. Originally it knows no sanctions other
than religious ones, that is, those emanating from a superhuman authority. Only later, at least within the narrower group itself, do there appear,
side by side with the transcendental sanctions, sanctions that are socially
immanent, that is to say, socially organized, to be fulfilled by the individuals according to the provisions of the social order. In relations among
the groups, blood revenge appears very early as a reaction against an injury considered unjustified and due to a member of a foreign group.
The group from which this reaction issues is a community based on
blood relationship. The reaction is induced by fear of the soul of the murdered person. The latter cannot revenge himself upon his murderer if he
belongs to a foreign group. Hence he compels his relatives to carry out
the revenge. The sanction so socially organized is itself guaranteed by a
transcendental sanction. Those who fail to revenge the death of their relative upon the foreign murderer and his group are threatened with sickness
and death by the murdered man. It seems that blood revenge is the earliest socially organized sanction. It is worthy of note that originally it
had an inter-tribal character. Only when the social community comprises
several groups based on blood relationship does blood revenge become an
intra-tribal institution.
In the further course of religious development, the divinity is conceived
of as pertaining to a reaim very different from the Here, and far removed
from it, and the realization of divine retribution is put off to the Hereafter. Very often this Hereafter is divided-corresponding to the two-fold
character of retribution-into a heaven and a hell. In this stage, the social
order has lost its purely religious character. The religious order functions
only as a supplement and support to the social order. The sanctions of the
latter are exclusively acts of human individuals regulated by the social
order itself.
It is a fact well worth noting, that of the two sanctions here presented
as typical-the disadvantage threatened in case of disobedience (punishment, in the broadest sense of the term), and the advantage promised in
case of obedience (the reward)-in social reality, the first plays a far more
important role than the second. That the technique of punishment is preferred to that of reward is especially clearly seen where the social order
still has a distinctly religious character, i.e., is guaranteed by transcendental sanctions. In the case of primitive peoples, behavior conforming to the
social order, especially the observance of the numerous prohibitions called
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"taboos," is determined principally by the fear that dominates the life of
such peoples. It is fear of the grievous evil with which the superhuman
authority reacts against every violation of traditional customs. If violations of the social norms are much less frequent in primitive societies than
in civilized societies, as ethnologists report to be the case, it is principally
this fear of the revenge of the spirits, fear of a punishment that is of divine
origin but which takes place Here, which is responsible for this effect of
preserving social order. The hope of reward has only a secondary significance. And even in more highly developed religions, where divine retribution is no longer or not only realized in this world, but in the Hereafter,
the idea of a punishment to be expected after death holds first place. In
the actual beliefs of mankind, fear of hell is much more lively and the picture of a place of punishment is much more concrete than the usually only
very vague hope of reward in heaven and the utterly colorless idea of a
future paradise. Even when the wish-fulfilling fantasy of individuals is
not limited by any restrictions, it imagines a transcendental order the
technique of which is not entirely different from the technique of empirical society.
This may be referrable to the fact that religious ideology always mirrors, more or less accurately, social reality. And in this, as far as the organization of the group is concerned, essentially only one method of bringing about socially desired behavior is taken into account: the threat and
the application of an evil in case of contrary behavior-the technique of
punishment. The technique of reward plays a significant role only in the
private relations of individuals.
The evil applied to the violator of the order when the sanction is socially organized, consists in a deprivation of possessions-life, health, freedom, or property. As the possessions are taken from him against his will,
this sanction has the character of a measure of coercion. This does not
mean that in carrying out the sanction physical force must be applied.
This is necessary only if resistance is encountered in applying the sanction. This is only exceptionally the case where the authority applying the
sanction possesses adequate power. A social order that seeks to bring
about the desired behavior of individuals by the enactment of such measures of coercion is called a coercive order. Such it is because it threatens
socially harmful deeds with measures of coercion, and decrees such measures of coercion. As such it presents a contrast to all other possible social
orders-those that provide reward rather than punishment as sanctions,
and especially those that enact no sanctions at all, relying on the technique of direct motivation. In contrast to the orders that enact coercive
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measures as sanctions, the efficacy of the others rests not on coercion but
on voluntary obedience.
Yet this contrast is not so distinct as it might at first sight appear. This
is apparent from the fact that the reward, as a technique of indirect motivation, has its place between indirect motivation through punishment, as
a technique of coercion, and direct motivation, the technique of voluntary
obedience. Voluntary obedience is itself a form of motivation, that is of
coercion, and hence is not freedom, but it is coercion in the psychological
sense. The element of psychic coercion cannot serve as the criterion for
distinguishing among different types of social orders. For the efficacy of
every social order rests on psychic coercion, because it rests upon motivation. If coercive orders are contrasted with those that have no coercive
character but rest on voluntary obedience, this is possible only in the
sense that one enacts measures of coercion as sanctions whereas the other
does not. And these sanctions are only coercive measures in the sense
that certain possessions are taken from the individuals in question against
their will.
In this sense the law is a coercive order.
II. LAW AS COERCIVE ORDER MONOPOLIZING THE USE OF FORCE

If the social orders, so extraordinarily different in their tenors, which
have been in force at different times and among the most different peoples
are all called legal orders, it might be supposed that one was using an expression almost devoid of meaning. What could the so-called law of ancient Babylonians have in common with the law-likewise so-calledthat prevails today in the United States? What could the social order of
a Negro tribe under the leadership of a despotic chieftain have in common
with the constitution of the Swiss Republic? Yet there is a common element which fully justifies this terminology, that enables the word "law"
to appear as the expression of a concept with a socially highly significant
meaning. For the word refers to that specific social technique of a coercive
order, which, despite the vast differences between the law of ancient Babylon and that of the United States of today, between the law of the Ashantis in West Africa and that of the Swiss in Europe, is yet essentially the
same for all these peoples differing so in time, in place, and in culture:
the social technique which consists in bringing about the desired social
conduct of men through threat of a measure of coercion which is to be
applied in case of contrary conduct.
While recognizing law as the specific social technique of the coercive
order, we can contrast it sharply with other social orders which pursue in
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part the same purposes as the law, but by quite different means. And
law is a means, a specific social means, not an end. Law, morality, and
religion-all three forbid murder. But the law does this by providing that
if a man commits murder, then another man, designated by the legal
order, shall apply against the murderer a certain measure of coercion,
prescribed by the legal order. Morality limits itself to requiring: thou
shalt not kill. And if a murderer is morally ostracized by his fellow-menand many an individual refrains from murder not so much because he
wants to avoid the punishment of the law, as to avoid the moral disapprobation of his fellow-men -the great distinction still remains, that the
reaction of the law consists in a measure of coercion enacted by the order,
and socially organized, whereas the moral reaction against immoral conduct is neither provided by the moral order, nor, if provided, socially organized. In this respect religious norms are nearer to legal norms than
moral norms are. For religious norms threaten the murderer with punishment by a superhuman authority. But the sanctions which the religious
norms lay down have a transcendental character; they are not socially
organized sanctions, even though, provided by the religious order. They
are probably more effective than the legal sanctions. Their efficacy, however, presupposes belief in the existence and power of a superhuman authority. It is not the effectiveness of the sanctions that is here in question, however, but only whether and how they are provided by the social
order. The socially organized sanction is an act of coercion which a person determined by the order directs, in a manner determined by the order,
against the person responsible for conduct contrary to the order. The
sanction is the reaction of the order, or, what amounts to the same thing,
the reaction of the community constituted by the order, to evildoers.
The individual who carries out the sanction acts as an agent of the social
community. The legal sanction is thus interpreted as an act of the legal
community; the transcendental sanction-the sickness or death of the
sinner-is an act of the superhuman authority of the deceased ancestors,
of God.
Among the paradoxes of the social technique here characterized as a
coercive order is the fact that its specific instrument, the coercive act, is
of exactly the same sort as the act which it seeks to prevent in the relations of individuals; that the sanction against socially injurious behavior
is itself such behavior. For that which is to be accomplished by the threat
of forcible deprivation of life, health, freedom, or property is precisely
that men in their mutual conduct shall refrain from forcibly depriving one
another of life, health, freedom, or property. Force is employed to prevent the employment of force.
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This contradiction is only apparent, however. The law is, to be sure,
an ordering for the promotion of peace, in that it forbids the use of force
in relations among the members of the community. Yet it does not absolutely preclude the use of force. Law and force must not be understood
as absolutely at variance with each other. Law is an organization of force.
For the law attaches certain conditions to the use of force in relations
among men, authorizing the employment of force only by certain individuals and only under certain circumstances. The law allows conduct
which, under all other circumstances, is to be considered as "forbidden."
To be forbidden means to be the very condition for such a coercive act
as a sanction. The individual who, authorized by the legal order, applies
the coercive measure (the sanction), acts as an organ of this order, or
of the community constituted thereby. And hence one may say that law
makes the use of force a monopoly of the community. And precisely by
so doing, law pacifies the community.
Peace is a condition in which there is no use of force. In this sense of
the word, law provides only relative, not absolute peace, in that it deprives the single individual of the right to employ force but reserves it
for the community. The peace of the law is not a condition of absolute
absence of force, a state of anarchy; it is a condition of monopoly of force,
a force monopoly of the community.
A community, in the long run, is possible only if each individual respects certain interests-life, health, freedom, and property of everyone
else-that is to say, if each refrains from forcibly interfering in these
spheres of interest of the other. The social technique that we call "law"
consists in inducing the individual, by a specific means, to refrain from forcible interference in the spheres of interests of others: in case of such interference, the legal community itself reacts with a like interference in the
spheres of interests of the individual responsible for the previous interference. Forcible interference in the spheres of interests of another, the measure of coercion, functions as delict and also as sanction. Law is an order
according to which the use of force is forbidden only as a delict, that is, as
a condition, but is allowed as a sanction, that is, as a consequence.
Inasmuch as forcible interference in the spheres of interest of the individual is permitted only as a reaction of the community against prohibited
conduct of that individual, inasmuch as forcible interference in the spheres
of interest of the individual is made a monopoly of the community, definite spheres of interest of the individual are protected. As long as there
exists no monopoly of the community in forcible interference in the
spheres of interest of the individual, that is to say, as long as the social
order does not stipulate that forcible interference in the spheres of interest
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of the individual may only be resorted to under very definite conditionsnamely, as a reaction against socially harmful interference in the spheres
of interest of the individuals, and then only by stipulated individualsso long are there no spheres of interest of the individual protected by the
social order. In other words, there is no state of law, which, in the sense
developed here, is essentially a state of peace.
MII.THE IDEA OF A COMMUNITY WITHOUT FORCE (NATURAL LAW)

The result of our investigation thus far is that the specific social technique that we call "law" consists in the establishment of a coercive order
by means of which a community monopoly is constituted for applying
the measures of coercion decreed by the order. Now the question arises
whether this social technique, the lw as a social technique, is unavoidable. Perhaps it is only the peculiar content of a social order which makes
it necessary to establish this order as a coercive order. Perhaps it is possible to give the social order such a content, to prescribe such conduct for
the individuals that it will no longer be necessary to. prescribe coercive
measures as sanctions in case of contrary conduct, because the individuals'
would have no inducement to such contrary behavior. Perhaps there is a
social order which would make possible a substitution of direct motivation, of voluntary obedience, for the specific technique of the law. The
question of the necessity of the law is identical with the question of the
necessity of the State. For the State is a coercive order, is a legal order,
a relatively centralized, relatively sovereign, legal order, or, what amounts
to the same thing, a community constituted by such a legal order. If the
State is defined as a political organization, that is only to say that it is a
coercive order. The specifically "political" element consists in nothing
but the element of coercion.
History presents no social condition in which large communities have
been constituted other than by coercive orders. Even the social community of the most primitive of primitives rests on a religious coercive order,
gradually becoming secularized. It is a legal community. The only reason
we do not call it a State is because the necessary degree of centralization
is still lacking. History confirms the saying: ubi societas, ibi jus.1 Yet
man has never been satisfied with this historic fact. He has always desired
a condition in which force-even used as sanction-would no longer be
exercised by man against man, and therefore there have always been optimists who deem such a condition possible, and political dreamers who
believe in a development leading to a "free" society, that is, a society free'
from all coercion, one in which there will no longer be any law, or, what
amounts to the same thing, any State.

1"Wherever

there is society, there is law."
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This is the doctrine of theoretical anarchism. This is, fundamentally,
the doctrine of so-called natural law, which is distinguishable from positive law by the circumstance that it requires no sanction to be efficacious,
and therefore has ceased to be "law," law in the sense that we call the historical orders to be found in social reality, law. He who believes in the
existence of a natural law believes in the existence of a social order, the
binding character of which results directly from its content. For this order
regulates human behavior in a way that corresponds to the nature of men
and to the nature of their relationships and is, therefore, a way satisfactory
to all the individuals whose conduct is regulated. For this very reason no
measures of coercion are required as sanctions for the case of behavior not
corresponding to the natural order. For such a possibility is excluded.
The natural order is just, that is, it makes all men happy. There is no
need to compel people to their own happiness. Hence one needs no State,
or, what amounts to the same thing, no positive law. The efficacy of the
natural order rests on voluntary obedience. The idea of natural law, in
the last analysis, is the anarchistic idea of the Golden Age that Ovid portrays in his classic verses:
Aurea prima sata est aetas, quae vindice nullo,
sponte sua, sine lege fidem rectumque colebat.
poena metusque aberant, nec verba minantia fixo
aere legebantur, nec supplex turba timebat
iudicis ora sui, sed erant sine iudice tuti?
For social pessimism, the Golden Age is the eternally lost paradise of the
past. Social optimism places it in the future. It is in either case an illusion, the product of wishful thinking.
If it were really possible for the human mind to fix upon the content of
a social order that could reckon on the voluntary obedience of all its subjects, because it corresponded to the nature of man and his mutual relations, because it required of men only what men themselves wished-an
order that would make everyone happy and that was therefore a just order, it would be hard to understand why such an order had not yet been
realized. For ever since mankind has thought at all, the most illustrious
minds have striven to think up such an order, to answer the question of
justice. Yet this question is as far from being answered today as it ever
was. Of none of the numerous attempts to solve the problem of social
technique can it be said that it is anywhere nearly as satisfactory, that is,
2Ovid, Metam., i, 89-93. "Golden was that first age, which, with no one to compel, without a law, of its own will, kept faith and did the right. There was no fear of punishment, no
threatening words were to be read on brazen tablets; no suppliant throng gazed fearfully upon
its judge's face; but without judges lived secure." (Translation by Miller, Loeb Classical
Library ed. 1916.)
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that it has come as near general satisfaction, as the solution of any one of
the innumerable problems of the technique of natural science. This in itself proves that the much-sought-after natural or just order, if it is discoverable at all, cannot by any means be so constituted that everyone will
immediately recognize it as just, and therefore be ready to obey it. On
the basis of our knowledge of human nature it must be considered very
unlikely that any social order, even one which, in the opinion of its creators, assures to individuals every desired advantage, runs no risk of being
violated, and hence need take no precautions to prevent such violations
against the will of actual or potential violators, that is, by measures of
coercion. It would have to be an order that permitted everyone to do or
refrain from doing whatever he wanted. But such an order is in reality
the suspension of all social order; it is the reestablishment of a state of
nature, which means a state of anarchy.
And this is perhaps the deepest meaning of the idea of a law of nature,
of a natural social order: the negation of society, back to nature. This
idea proceeds from the notion that man is "by nature" good. It ignores
the innate urge to aggression in men. It ignores the fact that the happiness of one man is often incompatible with the happiness of another, and
that therefore a natural just order that guarantees happiness to all, and
so does not have to react against disturbances with measures of coercion,
is not compatible with the "nature" of men as far as our knowledge of .it
goes. The "nature" 6f natural law is not the nature of our scientific experience, it is a moral postulate. To count on a human nature different
from that known to us is Utopia. This is not to say that human nature is
unchangeable, but only that we cannot foresee how it will change under
changing circumstances.
The Utopian character of the idea of a social condition not regulated
by any coercive order-a society of the future without law or State-appears clearly in the doctrine which has, up to now, most successfully represented this idea politically-the doctrine of Marxian Socialism. 3 This doctrine explains the necessity of the State and of what it terms "bourgeois"
law, by the fact that society is divided into classes-one possessing and
the other, without possessions, exploited by the first.- According to it the
only function of the coercive apparatus represented by the State and its
law is to maintain this condition. As soon as the conflict of classes ceases
by the abolition of private property and the socialization of the means of
production, as well as by planned control of the processes of production,
and a classless society has been attained, the apparatus of coercion will
become superfluous. In such a social condition, the State "dies"; with it,
3 Compare with the following discussion: Kelsen, Sozialismus und Staat (2d ed.

1923).
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law disappears. "The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of the processes of production." 4
The establishment of this condition marks "the rise of mankind from
the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom." On the road to this
anarchical society, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletarian
class State, such as exists today in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, is only a necessary transition. The political theory of Marxian
Socialism is pure anarchism. It is distinguishable from the doctrine directly called "anarchism," as for instance that of Bakunin, not by its aim.
The aim is in the one case as in the other, a community constituted without coercion, resting on voluntary obedience of the individiduals, a classless and therefore stateless community. The so-called "anarchists" believe that one can do away with the State at once, whereas Marxists teach
that, after the place of the capitalist State has been taken by that of the
socialist State, the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, the State will
gradually disappear of itself.
He who thinks that such a stateless society is possible is closing his eyes
to the fact that an economic organization such as that which socialism
is aiming for, must necessarily have an authoritative character. Aplanned
economy of such immense scope-embracing if possible the whole earthcan only be managed by a gigantic hierarchically organized administrative body, within which each individual, as an organ of the community,
will have a definite function to perform, precisely regulated by a normative order. Upon the conscientious observance of these norms depends
the productivity of the whole system, and it is just the higher degree of
productivity which is to give the planned economy, according to its adherents, the advantage over capitalistic production. If one calls the latter
"anarchy" of production, it is because one contrasts it with the socialistic
economy which is the opposite of anarchy.5 The norms of the socialistic
ordering of the economic life can appear only in the form of commands directed by individuals to individuals, a "government over individuals."
Never can "direction of the processes of production" take the place of
"government over individuals," as the Marxian theory formulates it. For
the processes of production are aggregates of human transactions that proceed according to the scheme of commanding and obeying. A social order
that completely regulates the system of economic production and the distribution of the products and is executed by organs of the community
must of necessity extend its competence to fields other than economic.
4Engels, Socialism, Utopian and Scientific 75-77 (translation by Aveling, Kerr ed. z9o8).
s There is a notorious contradiction between the economic and the political theory of

Marxian Socialism.
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Such a social order, more than any other, has a tendency to become a
totalitarian order, which regulates all the cultural realms, and not least,
the sexual relations of the individuals. Such an order, more than any
other, will need ideological justification, and hence will not leave metaphysical-religious spheres untouched. It must necessarily limit the freedom of the individual much more severely than any State ever has. For
this reason alone such a State must count on disturbances on the part of
its individuals no less than must the legal orders of bourgeois society.
Let us leave out of consideration here the fact that laziness and stupidity will not quite disappear even in the socialistic community and must
here be much more dangerous for the continuance of the order than in a
capitalistic State. Let us assume that violations of the legal order of this
latter State occur for the most part on economic grounds, and that in the
socialistic State such grounds are completely lacking. Still one must assume that here other causes for behavior not corresponding to the order
will play so much the greater role. If it is not the incompletely satisfied
economic needs of the individual that may lead to a disturbance of the
order, it must be other needs-needs arising from his desire for prestige,
his libido, and last but not least, from his -religious emotions. There
may be a difference of opinion about the justification for such needs and
the permissible extent of their satisfaction, but their existence cannot be
denied. And furthermore one cannot deny that these needs must make
themselves felt the more strongly, the more the economic needs are satisfied, and that no solution of the problems arising in this connection is to
be expected from the idea of economic socialism. Desire for prestige,
libido, and religious emotion are nio less revolutionary factors than are
hunger and thirst. Only a view that identifies society with economy can
fail to see the great dangers that threaten a-social order from this direction.
If one must admit that a socialistic order cannot count in all directions
upon the voluntary obedience of its subjects, that it, as well as the order
of a bourgeois society, must reckon with conduct of individuals not in
conformity with the order, then one must also admit that even this order
cannot refrain from proceeding against these individuals with measures
of coercion, i.e., with measures which, if necessary, must be applied against
the will of the individuals acting in a socially harmful manner.
In a socialistic community, prophylactic measures to prevent crimes
may be made use of to a greater extent than is possible in the legal community of the capitalistic State. On the basis of our knowledge of such
methods in the past, however, we cannot expect that preventive measures
can be so effective as to render repressive measures wholly superfluous.
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As long as we remain in the domain of experience, we must assume that
even a socialistic order must be a coercive order, and that the State will
not die off, but that its order will acquire a different content. Even Socialism cannot get along without the social technique called law. Even in a
socialistic society it is true that ubi societas, ibijus.
T

EEVOLUTION OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE

I. DIFFERENTIATION OF THE DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN
CREATION AND APPLICATION OF LAW

If coercion is an essential element of law in the sense presented here,
then every legal order, regarded from a technical point of view, must be
presented as a complex of norms in which coercive measures are decreed
as sanctions. All other facts to which the legal order applies come into
consideration only as conditions of the sanction. The specific technique of
the law-the technique of indirect motivation7-consists in the very fact
that it attaches to certain conditions certain coercive measures as consequences. Morality, whose technique is direct motivation, says, thou shalt
not steal. The law says, if one steals, he shall be punished. The moral
norm regulates the behavior of one individual; the legal norm, always that
of at least two individuals, he whose behavior furnishes the condition of
the sanction (the subject) and he whose duty it is to apply the sanction
(the organ). The decisive, though not the only, condition of the sanction
is that conduct of the subject which, according to the intent of the legal
order, should be avoided, the delict. The legal order, by attaching a sanction to this conduct and thus characterizing it as delict, seeks to induce
the opposite conduct, that which will not invoke the sanction. To say that
one has a legal duty to behave in a certain way means that he is threatened with a sanction in case of contrary behavior, that is, in case of a
delict. The relation established by the legal norm between delict and sanction is the fundamental relation of the law, insofar as this is regarded in
a state of rest. It is the fundamental relation of the statics of the law.
If we now look at the law in its specific movement, that is, if we regard
the process of the creation of the law, we observe the fact, of especial
significance for the technique of the law, that it regulates its own creation.
A norm counts as a legal norm, belongs to a certain legal order only if it
has come into being in a certain way, and that, a way stipulated by a
norm of the very order. This is the essence of positive law.
There are two methods of creatind law: custom, that is, the repeated
similar conduct of the subject, and legislation in the broadest sense of the
word, that is, the conscious act of a special organ set up for the purpose of
creating law. All law is-according to the provisions of the legal order-
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law created by custom or by legislation (in the broadest sense). In this
it is distinguishable from natural law, which need not be created by the
act of man, since it issues directly from the nature of men or the nature
of the relations of men, and as such need only be recognized by man, not
created by an act of will.
Positive law not only has to be created, it must be applied. In the progression from creation of the law to its application lie the typical dynamics of the law. It is also characteristic of the technique of the law
that these dynamics unfold in at least two stages. The law is first created
as a general norm. The application of the general norm to a concrete case
consists in the determination whether the condition established by the
norm in an abstract manner is present, so that a concrete sanction, determined by the norm only in an abstract fashion, can be decreed or applied in this concrete case. If the application of the concrete sanction is
preceded by the decreeing of this sanction, then there are three stages of
the dynamic legal process: the creation of the general norm , the creation
of the individual norm decreeing the sanction, and the execution of the
individual norm. The process of the creation of the general norm may,
however, itself be split up into several stages. An example is the relationship between a constitution and the statutes enacted by the lawmaking
body on the basis of that constitution. On the basis of these statutes ordinances or regulations are emitted by the executive organs. These ordinances or regulations are then applied to the concrete case by the judicial
or administrative organs. Every legal order forms a hierarchy of general
and individual norms, the lowest step of which is the execution of a concrete measure.
The direction of the technical development is that of increasing differentiation among the steps of these legal dynamics. The dynamics of the
primitive legal order has only two stages: the development of the general
norm through custom, and its application by the subject whose interests,
protected by this norm, have been violated. This subject is authorized
by the legal order to react against the violator of the law with the sanction provided by the law. Primitive law is characterized by the technique
of self-help. Blood revenge is a typical example: the subject himself,
whose interests have been violated, and not a special organ, must determine whether or not a delict has been committed. The subject himself
must fulfil the sanction without its being decreed by an individual norm,
which an organ different from the injured subject must enact and execute.
The primitive law of self-help is characterized by the fact that the general
norm is applied directly to the concrete instance without being individualized by an individual norm. Only after courts have developed does an
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individual norm insert itself between the general norm and its application to a concrete case, the execution of the sanction. This individual
norm is the decree of the sanction by court decision. On the other hand,
the process of creation of the general norms also changes in the course of
development, so that the dynamic legal process finally is spent in a complicated series of numerous stages.
II. DIFFERENTIATION OF THE STATIC RELATION

BETWEEN DELICT AND SANCTION

a) Differentiationof the sanction: criminallaw and civil law.-Not only
the dynamic relation between the creation of law and its application, but
also the static relation between delict and sanction is subject to a typical
change. Originally there was only one sort of coercive measure--punishment, in the narrower sense of the word; punishment involving life, limb,
freedom, or property. The oldest law was only penal law. Later a differentiation in the sanction came about, in that, in addition to punishment,
there appeared civil execution, the coercive deprivation of property with
the purpose of compensating for illegally caused damage. That is to say
that civil law developed along side of penal law. But the civil law, regulating the economic relations of individuals guarantees the behavior desired in this field in a manner not essentially different from that in which
penal law does the same thing in its field, namely by establishing in the
last analysis, sometimes indirectly, a measure of coercion for the case of
contrary conduct-its own specific measure of coercion, civil execution.
Penal law is distinguishable from civil law principally through the fact
that its sanction has a different character. The difference lies not so much
in the outward circumstance of the sanction. The sanction is in both instances a coercive measure, by which the individual in question is divested
of possessions. Civil execution involves only property. But this is true
also of fines. The difference between penal and civil sanction is rather
that the purpose of the latter is to make reparation of the damage caused
by the socially harmful conduct, whereas that of the former is retribution,
or-according to the modem view-prevention. But this distinction is
only relative. For one can hardly deny that the civil sanction also serves
as a. deterrent, even if only secondarily.
The relative difference between criminal and civil sanction is expressed
in the content of the legal order. This legal order contains specific provisions for the use of the property forcibly taken. In the case of civil
sanction this property is to be turned over to the illegally wronged subject;
in the case of criminal sanction it falls to the legal community.
A further difference is to be found in the procedure that leads to the
two sanctions as it has actually developed in the different legal orders.
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The judicial process whose aim is civil execution is initiated only upon
demand of a specific subject interested in the execution; the judicial
process whose aim is the application of punishment is initiated ex officio,
or upon demand of an organ of the community. A civil process has the
form of a dispute between two parties, the plaintiff and the defendant; a
civil delict is the violation of a right. He who, by his suit, can set in motion the procedure which leads to civil sanction, is the subject of a right.
The according of such rights to the subject and the possibility of pursuing them in a contentious procedure characterize the technique of a legal
order that regulates economic life according to the principle of private
property. The available economic goods are at the exclusive disposition
of private individuals, and this enjoyment of private property is achieved,
essentially, by free contract among the individuals. The "right" which
the subject has to a thing consists in the power accorded the subject by
the legal order to prevent any other subject from interfering with his enjoyment thereof. The specific method of preventing such interference is
the possibility accorded by the legal order of setting in motion the coercive
process against anyone who disturbs or interferes with the object in that
enjoyment.
This power of the subject is a political power, a public function par
excellence. But in this system it is ideologically called a specific sphere of
"private" interest; the norms granting this power are called "private"
law; the power itself, a "private" right. A consequence of this technique
of "private" right is that the process by which the general legal norm is
applied to the concrete case, the civil sanction decreed and executed
against the delinquent, has the character of a contentious procedure.
Only in imitation of the civil procedure does the penal procedure in which
the criminal sanction is decreed and applied still have the outward character of a dispute, although here no subjective rights usually exist any
longer. When, instead of the subject whose interests have been injured
by the criminal delict, an organ of the community appears as plaintiff,
one can speak only in a very figurative sense of a "right" of the community to cessation of the delict. But even aside from the fact that the application of the legal norm in both civil and criminal law takes place in the
form of a contentious procedure, the social technique is in both cases essentially the same: reaction against the delict in the form of an act of
coercion as a sanction.
b) Differentiationof the sanction: collective responsibilityand individual
responsibility.-Thedelict is a condition of the sanction. It has been demonstrated that one is legally obligated to certain behavior when contrary
behavior is threatened with a sanction. The specific sanction of the law
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is an act of coercion-depriving one forcibly of life, health, freedom, or
property. Against whom is this sanction directed; whose life, health, freedom, or property is to be forcibly taken away? In accordance with the
answer to this question, the technically primitive legal order is distinguished from the technically developed legal order. It corresponds to a
more refined sense of justice for the sanction to be directed only against
those whose behavior constitutes the legal duty, and whose undutiful behavior, therefore, constitutes the delict as the condition of the sanction.
If a legal order forbids murder, that is to say, if it provides a punishment
for committing murder, then the punishment is to be directed against the
murderer and only the murderer; in other words, against the individual,
who, under obligation to abstain from murdering, has, in violation of this
duty, committed murder. If we call the individual against whom the
sanction is directed the one who is responsible for the delict, then the requirement of the more refined legal technique runs as follows: only he who
commits the delict, only the delinquent, is to be responsible for the delict.
This is the principle of individual responsibility.
Primitive legal orders, however, do not meet this requirement. It is not
contrary to a primitive sense of justice for the sanction to be directed not
only against the murderer himself, but against his relatives as well, against
all those belonging to his family or his tribe, in other words, against the
members of the circumscribed group to which he belongs. Not only he
who actually committed the delict is responsible, but others as well. Even
in the Bible it is taken as a matter of course that for the sins of the father,
the children and the children's children shall be punished.6 The circle of
those responsible is defined by the fact that they belong to a definite social
group, to the same legal community. This is the principle of collective
responsibility.
This principle may hark back to the fact that according to primitive
conception a very close bond exists between an individual and the other
members of his group. Primitive man identifies the individual with his
group, with all the other members of it. Primitive man does not regard
himself as a self-sufficient individual, different from and independent of
his group, but rather as an integral element of it. For him it is a matter of
course that each member of the group is responsible for every other member. Just as a heroic deed of one member of the group calls forth satisfaction and pride from all the otherp, so it is also deemed just that a delict of
one member of the group should be avenged on all its members. Collective
responsibility is a typical element of the state of justice in which the principle of self-help still subsists. Blood revenge, that typical form of self6

Exodus 20:5.
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help, is by no means directed against only the individual who has committed the deed to be avenged, but against his whole family. It is the
reaction of one group against another group.
The technical development of the law is characterized by the progress
from collective towards individual responsibility.
c) Differentiation of the delict: absolute liability and culpability.-Very
closely connected with the difference between individual and collective responsibility is another distinction, which also concerns the solution of the
problem of responsibility. To be responsible for a socially harmful or socially useful result, it does not suffice, according to modern, ethical views,
for the result actually to have been brought about by one's own conduct.
The result must have been brought about in a definite manner. If an individual is to be made responsible for a result brought about by him, he must
have intended this result; if it is a question of socially harmful conduct,
he must have conducted himself at least negligently.
If the delict consists of certain behavior of the individual involving a
socially harmful result, then there must exist between the conduct and
its result a specific mental connection that one calls intent or negligence.
In order for given behavior to operate as a condition of the sanction, as
a delict, it must have this particular mental quality; certain mental elements must be present that one calls "culpa." For example, someone is
felling a tree; the falling tree kills a man. If the man felling the tree is
made responsible for the death of the person without regard to whether
he acted with intent, or with negligence, then it is a case of absolute liability. If, however, the feller of the tree is punished only if he intended
by his actions to bring about the death of the man, or if he negligently
failed to give warning of the existing danger, then it is a case of culpability. This principle is unknown to primitive legal orders; there the principle of so-called absolute liability prevails. Whoever brings about, no matter how, a result designated by the legal order as socially injurious is punishable. Where the principle of collective responsibility exists, absolute
liability is almost unavoidable, for there the sanction is directed to include
individuals who have not themselves brought about the result but who
merely belong to the same social community as the perpetrator, the individual who did bring about the result by his behavior. If the principle of
collective responsibility is supplanted by that of individual responsibility,
the way is also made free for the substitution of the principle of culpability for that of absolute liability.
The technical development of the law is characterized by progress not
only from collective to individual responsibility, but also from absolute
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liability to culpability. But it should be noted that this is only the formulation of a general rule which exhibits important exceptions. Even in modern legal orders the principle of collective responsibility and that of absolute liability have by no means been given up, Thus the first principle
is exhibited in the law of so-called juristic persons; the second, in many
spheres of civil law. The form of culpability called "negligence" is not
far removed from absolute liability. Especially in international law, both
principles are still to be regarded as controlling.
M. CENTRALIZATION

Of the greatest importance for the technical development of the law
is the process of centralization. Primitive law is in a condition of complete
decentralization. It knows as yet no organ functioning according to the
principle of the division of labor. All the functions of creation as well as
application of the legal norms are performed by all the subjects. Only
gradually do special organs develop for the different functions. In the
field of law the same process takes place as in that of economic production. Here, too, it is a process of centralization.
In the field of law this process is characterized by the surprising fact
that the centralization of the law-applying function precedes the centralization of the law-creating function. Long before special legislative organs
come into existence, courts are established to apply the law to concrete
cases. The law, thus applied, is customary law, law created by a specific
method. The peculiarity of this method is that the general legal norms
are created by collaboration of all the individuals subject to the legal
order. It is a totally decentralized means of creating law. During thousands upon thousands of years it was the only way of creating general
legal norms. The application of the law, however, long ago became the
exclusive function of special organs, was long since centralized. No longer
is each individual authorized to decide whether or not his rights have
been violated, whether or not he will react by a sanction against another
individual, responsible for the violation of law. Such decisions have for
long been entrusted to a judge, a special organ different from and independent of the parties in conflict. The general norms, however, in accordance with which the judge decides such conflicts, are not always created
by a central organ; they still have the character of customary law. Customary law forms an important part of the legal order even in technically
highly developed legal communities.
The procedure of applying general legal norms to concrete cases involves-as we have seen-three distinct phases: first, the conditioning
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facts must be established, especially the delict, the concrete violation of
law; second, the sanction provided by the general legal norm must be
ordered to be applied to the concrete case; and third, this sanction must
be executed against the individual responsible for the delict. The three
stages of this procedure do not necessarily become centralized at the same
time. Historically, the centralization of the first two stages has probably
preceded the centralization of the third stage. It was probably first only
the establishment of the fact of a concrete violation of the law that was
given over to an objective authority, a court.
This step is of the greatest importance. For upon the decision of the
question whether or not in a concrete case a delict has been committed
depends the possibility of applying to a concrete case the general norm
that attaches a sanction to this delict. If a legal order attaches to a certain fact as condition a certain consequence, then it must determine in
what manner, and especially by whom, the existence of the conditioning
fact is to be established in order that the consequence provided for may
be attached to it. It is a fundamental, though often overlooked, principle
of legal technique that in the province of law there are no absolute, directly evident facts, no facts "in themselves," but only facts established
by the competent authority in a procedure prescribed by the legal order.
It is not theft as a fact in itself to which the legal order attaches a certain
punishment. Only a layman formulates the rule of law in that way. The
jurist knows that the legal order attaches a certain punishment only to a
theft established by the competent authority following a prescribed procedure. To say that A has committed a theft can only express a subjective opinion. In the province of law only the authentic opinion, that is,
the opinion of the authority instituted by the legal order to establish the
fact, is decisive. Any other opinion as to the existence of a fact as determined by the legal order is irrelevant from a juristic point of view.
If the legal order establishes no special organs for determining the conditioning facts, especially the delict, then it is the interested parties themselves that are called upon by the legal order to establish the existence of
these facts in the concrete case. Such is the condition of a primitive decentralized legal order. If under such circumstances one subject claims
to have been injured by the behavior of another subject and the latter
denies it, the essential issue remains undetermined. It can be determined
in the sense of a primitive decentralized legal order only by agreement of
the parties to the dispute. It is obvious that such agreement can but very
seldom be reached. If a subject proceeds without such agreement to an
act of coercion against another subject, it is uncertain whether his act
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constitutes a sanction or a delict in the sense of the legal order, that is,
whether in this case the legal order was being applied or violated. Hence,
for the technical development of the law, no other step was of such importance as the establishment of courts for the determination of the question
whether or not in a concrete case a delict was involved. Only by the centralization of this phase of the application of the law was application of
the law in all cases possible.
The centralization of the other two phases of the application of the law
(the decreeing and the executing of the sanction) is of lesser importance.
It seems to be the last step. With it the legal status of self-help by blood
revenge is supplanted. In its place appears execution of the sanction by a
special organ of the community.
It seems, however, that the state of self-help was only gradually eliminated. In the early days, the courts were hardly more than tribunals of
arbitration. They had to decide whether or not the delict had actually
been committed, as claimed by one party, and whether or not that party
was authorized to execute a sanction against the other, if the conflict
could not be settled by peaceful agreement between them. To bring about
such a peaceful agreement, enabling the vendetta to be replaced by wergild, was probably the first task of the tribunal. Only at a later stage does
it become possible completely to abolish the procedure of self-help, according to which the sanction is executed by the individuals whose interests have been violated by the delict. The execution of the sanction by a
central organ of the legal community, authorized to punish the guilty individual, presupposes a concentration of the means of power and the existence of a central organ with all these means of power at its disposal.
To centralize the execution of the sanctions provided by the legal order
the legal community needs not only courts but also a powerful administration.
A legal community which has an administration and courts is a State.
The State, as we have pointed out, is a centralized legal order, or-what
amounts to the same--a community constituted by a centralized legal
order. From a technical point of view it is very characteristic that a legislative organ is not an essential requisite of a State. It is the centralization
of the judicial and administrative, not the lawmaking function, which
makes a primitive community a State. The jurisdiction of State courts
is older than State legislation.
Although the court preceded the legislative organ, it was not the first
central organ. The first central organ was probably the chieftain, in his
position as military leader of his group in war against another group.
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just as the first socially organized sanction, blood revenge, appears in the
relation of one group to another, so also centralization was first applied
to inter-tribal relations. In the beginning, however, the position of the
chieftain was of no importance so far as the formation of intra-tribal law
was concerned. As soon as his position becomes a permanent institution
and is concerned with intra-tribal legal matters, the chief appears as
judge, not as legislator.
Apart from war and the other relations with foreign States, which are
regulated by international law, in the beginning of the development the
judicial and legislative functions stand in the foreground, the administrative function in the background. In recent times this relationship has
changed in favor of the administrative function. The State, from a judicial State, has become an administrative State. This is so, chiefly in the
sense that it is no longer only the courts that are called upon to apply
the laws but, to an increasing extent, the administrative authorities as
well; that side by side with civil and penal laws administrative laws appear in increasing numbers. The latter can achieve the aims of the administration by seeking to bring about by threat of a sanction conduct of
the citizen considered desirable by the administration. For example, by
a law the citizens are obliged to lay out a public road or to build a school,
install instructors, and have their children taught. If they fail to do this,
they are punished by special administrative authorities. In such a case
the technique of the national administration is the same as that of the
national judiciary. This is the type of indirect administration. The type
of direct administration of the State is presented by the case where the
public road is laid out not by private persons but by public organs, where
the school is built not by private persons but by public organs, and instruction furnished not by private persons but by public organs. This activity,
termed direct administration, is quite different from the judicial. It appears not among the duties of private subjects, but among the duties of
public organs. They are individuals who are characterized in a specific
way determined by the legal order. Since the purpose of the administration, even in the case of direct administration, is achieved by individuals
being legally obligated to this activity, that is to say that the reaction to
contrary conduct is a measure of coercion, even direct administration remains within the framework of the specific technique of the law-indirect
motivation.
The development of the State is clearly proceeding in the direction of
an accelerated increase in direct administration. The legal technique of
direct administration is the technique of the socialistic State in distinction
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to that of the liberal-capitalistic State, which, insofar as it develops administrative activity, prefers the technique of indirect administration.
The path from indirect to direct administration of the State is also the
path of increasing centralization.
The distinction between centralization and decentralization is, finally,
also decisive for the relations among States. International law is a radically decentralized legal order. Its technique reveals all the typical characteristics of a primitive law; the creation by custom of the norms valid
for the whole realm of the legal community; no special organs for the
application of the general legal norms to the concrete case, but, instead,
self-help on the part of the subject whose rights have been injured; collective responsibility, absolute liability. A particular peculiarity of the technique of international law is that its subjects are juristic persons-States.
A juristic person is the personification of a legal order, in whole or in part.
To say that a legal order obligates and authorizes a juristic person is not
to say that it does not obligate and authorize individuals. It means only
that the legal order obligates them not directly but indirectly, through the
medium of another legal order, the one whose personification is regarded
as the subject of the obligating, authorizing legal order. To say that international law obligates and authorizes States means that international law
obligates and authorizes individuals in their capacity as organs of the
States, individuals who are designated by a national legal order to be organs
of this order or of the community constituted by it. That means that the
norms of the international legal order are not complete norms; in order
to be applied at all they must be supplemented by the norms of the national legal orders. This supplementation consists in the designation of
the individuals who, in their capacity as organs of the States, have to
fulfil the international duties and to exercise the international rights of
the States. This is the rule. As an exception there are also norms of international law determining directly the individuals whose conduct forms
the substance of the international duties and rights of the States.
One may assume that the technical development of international law
is progressing on the same path as that already taken by the development
of the legal orders of the States. Very suggestive is the fact that in international law the centralization has begun with the establishment of
courts. Courts are the first relatively centralized organs of international
law. To the extent that the direct obligating and authorizing of individuals and centralization increases in international law, the boundary between national and international law tends to disappear, and the legal
organization of mankind approaches the idea of a World-State.

